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JURISDICTION BEFORE AND AFTER SHAFFER
V. HEITNER
INTRODUCTION
The power of a state court to entertain a lawsuit is a long-
standing subject of judicial analysis in the history of American
jurisprudence. The problems involved in the analysis emanate
from the nature of the framework of the United States, which
places territorial limitations on the power of the respective
states. Over the years the courts have formulated tests to deter-
mine whether a state court has jurisdiction over the parties to
a lawsuit. The last major word on jurisdiction was articulated
by the United States Supreme Court in June of 1977 in the case
of Shaffer v. Heitner.'
For the first time,2 the United States Supreme Court ap-
plied the jurisdictional rules governing in personam :' proceed-
ings to a quasi in rem case.' Before Shaffer, a state court had
power to render judgment against a party-defendant not sub-
ject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court if that defen-
dant's assets, located within the territorial limits of the forum
state, were before the court.' Usually, such assets were unre-
lated to the action before the court, except to the extent that
the presence of such property conferred power on the court to
entertain the litigation. The Shaffer court, however, would not
allow a Delaware court to assert jurisdiction over a proceeding
brought before it on such a basis.' The Court held that quasi
in rem proceedings should be governed by the jurisdictional
rules applicable to in personam actions.7
The Shaffer Court required that there must be minimum
contacts between the state and the party-defendant such that
jurisdictional assertion on the part of the state would be consis-
tent with fairness and due process requirements regardless of
1 1979 by Susan Norman.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. Id.
3. An action for proceeding in personam is one directed against a specific person
or persons. "If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's
person, the action and judgment are denominated 'in personam' and it can impose a
personal obligation in favor of the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 199.
4. An action or proceeding in rem is one directed against specific property. "A
judgment in rem affects the interest of all persons in designated property." Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
5. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
6. 433 U.S. at 209.
7. Id. at 207.
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whether the case is brought on an in personam or in rem basis.'
The test articulated in Shaffer was adopted from the rule of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.' International Shoe
was, before Shaffer, used only as a guideline to determine if a
court can exercise its in personam jurisdictional powers.
Shaffer extended the rule of International Shoe to cases
brought in rem."' Shaffer thus represents the proposition that
no distinction will be drawn between in rem and in personam
actions in terms of ascertaining whether a court has constitu-
tional power to hear and decide a case brought before-it.
Equally important, the Shaffer decision reflects an atti-
tude that quantitative, mechanical jurisdictional tests, which
can no longer be considered adequate in determining if a court
has in personam jurisdiction," are also inadequate in determin-
ing jurisdictional issues in in rem proceedings. The focus in
Shaffer is on the quality of the relationship between the defen-
dant, the litigation, and the forum state, and on the fairness
or reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction under the circum-
stances presented. 2 In addition to the specific holding, that the
mere presence of a non-resident's property in a state cannot
justify an assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction if the property
has nothing to do with the subject matter of the litigation,"
Shaffer provides a new standard of reasonableness by which all
jurisdictional issues will be resolved.' 4 That standard gives in-
creased importance to the peculiar facts of each case, resulting
in more cases which can be plausibly argued either way, and
fewer situations which fall neatly within pre-Shaffer jurisdic-
tional tests.
This comment will trace the development of pre-Shaffer
jurisdictional rules, as well as analyze and critique the Shaffer
decision in light of these rules. The focus of this comment will
be on the test enunciated in Shaffer, how that test can be
interpreted, and the likely effect of Shaffer v. Heitner on the
outcome of litigation over different types of jurisdictional is-
sues.
8. Id.
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. 433 U.S. at 207.
11. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. 433 U.S. at 214-15.
13. Id. at 209.
14. See notes 74, 118-121 and accompanying text infra.
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PRE-Shaffer JURISDICTIONAL RULES
Introduction
Jurisdiction is the underlying basis of a court's power to
render a valid judgment. In order for jurisdiction to lie, three
prerequisites must be met. First, the parties to the lawsuit
must be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
This is often termed procedural due process. Second, the court
must have authority, from statute, both to decide the type of
case brought before it and to affect the rights, liabilities, or
status of the persons or property before it. This is known as
subject matter jurisdiction. Third, assuming power has been
conferred by statute on the court, the exercise of such power
must be consistent with constitutional standards. That is,
there must be a constitutionally sufficient "contact" between
the forum, the litigation, and the person or res involved. This.
is known as substantive due process.' 5 The focus here is on
substantive due process in the jurisdictional context.
. The traditional common law notion of jurisdiction over
parties or property was grounded on a theory of physical power;
that is, a court can exercise jurisdiction only over persons and
property within the territorial limits of the state in which the
court sits." While the rules governing in personam jurisdic-
tion have departed drastically from the physical power
theory,'7 the rules affecting in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction
have remained theoretically unchanged. With a few excep-
tions,'8 a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over property lo-
cated outside its territorial limits.
In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over property is either in rem or quasi in rem.
While the terms in rem and quasi in rem are often used inter-
changeably, each term has distinct characteristics. An in rem
proceeding is one in which the state court's jurisdiction is
grounded on the presence of the property which is the subject
15. See generally F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 12 (1977).
16. The court derives this power from the state in which it sits. A state has
primary authority over persons and property within its territorial limits. A state con-
fers this power on its courts by statute. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 623,
628.
17. See notes 40-65 and accompanying text infra.
18. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 627-29. "JIlt is widely
held that a court having personal jurisdiction over parties may adjudicate the equities
between them with respect to land outside the state .. " Id. at 628.
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matter of the litigation within the territorial boundaries of the
state. The defendant does not have to be subject to the in
personam jurisdiction of the court. An in rem judgment fixing
the status of such property is binding on the whole world.'" In
a quasi in rem proceeding the plaintiff brings the local assets
of the non-resident defendant before the court, usually through
statutory proceedings such as writ of attachment, garnishment,
or sequestration."0 The court may then take jurisdiction over
such assets and treat the action as in rem to the extent of the
assets before the court. A quasi in rem judgment determines
the status of the property as between the named parties to the
suit.
The major conceptual difference between a purely in rem
action and a quasi in rem action is that in an in rem action the
claim arises directly out of the presence of the property within
the forum state, and the property itself is the subject of the
action, while in a quasi in rem action the claim is unrelated to
the property brought before the court" except to the extent
that the presence of such property confers power on the court
to entertain the litigation.
The historical basis of in rem jurisdiction is the power of
the state to determine title to all property, tangible and intan-
gible, lying within its borders." The most common forms of
pure in rem cases are admiralty proceedings, actions to register
title to land, 3 actions to condemn or confiscate real or personal
property, 4 and the administration of a decedent's estate."
While the result of these actions will affect the personal rights
of certain parties, the essential function of such suits is to
determine the title or the status of property subject to the
19. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 36-37 (1972).
20. A writ of attachment is a writ used to seize property for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction over that property. Garnishment is a proceeding in which a
person's property in the possession of another is attached in order to pay the former's
debt to a third party. Sequestration empowers the sheriff, while a lawsuit is pending,
to seize property until the suit has been decided in order that it might be delivered to
the party adjudged to be entitled to possession.
21. In certain situations, a claim might arise out of the presence of a non-
resident's land in the forum state. Such a non-resident may not be subject to the in
personam jurisdiction of the forum court. See notes 101-103 and accompanying text
infra. Jurisdiction could be asserted here on a quasi in rem basis by attaching the
defendant's land and thereby forcing him to answer a claim arising out of such land.
See notes 104-105 and accompanying text infra.
22. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
23. Tyler v. Judges of the Ct. of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812 (1900).
24. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
25. See M. GREEN, supra note 19, at 37.
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court's in rem jurisdiction.
Most quasi in rem proceedings, whether brought before the
court by means of attachment, garnishment, or sequestration,
have one common thread: the property brought before the
court is not the subject matter of the litigation 6 as in the pure
in rem examples mentioned above. Rather, quasi in rem juris-
diction is a technique developed whereby an action that is
essentially in personam can be converted into an in rem action
in order for the court to proceed." Illustrative of this type of
litigation are the well known cases of Harris v. Balk2" and
Seider v. Roth. 9
In Harris v. Balk,30 Epstein, a Maryland resident, in order
to satisfy a claim he had against Balk, garnished a debt Harris
owed to Balk while Harris was in Maryland. When Balk later
sued Harris for the debt in North Carolina, the United States
Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit clause3' re-
quired that the money Harris paid to Epstein vindicated the
debt Harris owed to Balk.32 The Harris court considered the
debt tantamount to a res, having its situs wherever the debtor
could be found.33 Maryland's statute authorizing garnishment
of such a debt34 as a means of asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction
was upheld as constitutional. 5
Seider v. Roth36 held that the obligation of an insurance
company to defend and indemnify an insured may be at-
tached. The plaintiff in Seider, by attaching the insured's
rights in an insurance policy issued by a company doing busi-
ness in New York, was able to obtain a quasi in rem judgment
against the insured for injuries sustained in an automobile ac-
cident. The insured was a non-resident who would not have
been subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the New York
courts.
26. See note 21 supra. Quasi in rem cases which do not exemplify this character-
istic are cases involving the status rights of the parties. See note 114 and accompanying
test infra.
27. See notes 30-39 and accompanying text infra.
28. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
29. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
30. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
32. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
33. Id. at 223.
34. 198 U.S. at 224.
35. Id. at 226.
36. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
37. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
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As a practical matter, what cases such as Seider and
Harris did was allow a plaintiff, in a situation where he or she
could not acquire in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant, to circumvent this obstacle by attaching, through
available statutory means, the property of the defendant lo-
cated within the forum state in order to satisfy the claim.
Under Harris and Seider, the respective plaintiffs' inability to
acquire in personam jurisdiction did not preclude recovery.
The rule established in Shaffer v. Heitner" will no longer per-
mit a party-plaintiff to utilize this tool. 9
In Personam Jurisdiction
The Pennoyer Rule. The modern rules governing in per-
sonam jurisdiction have evolved from the century-old case of
Pennoyer v. Neff.4 Consistent with the power theory of juris-
diction,4' Pennoyer held that the personal rights and liabilities
of a party-defendant could not be determined by a court unless
the defendant was personally served within the forum state.
In so holding, the Pennoyer Court overruled an Oregon judg-
ment rendered against a non-resident defendant who was given
only constructive notice of the suit. In order to satisfy the judg-
ment, the Oregon court ordered a sheriff's sale of the non-
resident's Oregon property. The opinion suggested that, had
the property been brought before the court by attachment prior
to judgment, the Oregon court would have had jurisdiction to
proceed on a quasi in rem jurisdictional basis. 3 But Justice
Field pointed out in his opinion in Pennoyer:
[tihe jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and deter-
mine his obligations at all is only incidental to its jurisdic-
tion over the property. Its jurisdiction in that respect can-
not be made to depend upon facts to be ascertained after
it has tried the cause and rendered the judgement."
Pennoyer not only articulated the power rule for in per-
sonam jurisdiction, but also laid out the foundation for quasi
in rem jurisdiction. According to the Shaffer Court, the Court
in Pennoyer assumed that a proceeding against property is not
38. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
39. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text infra.
40. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
41. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
42. 95 U.S. at 727.
43. Id. at 728.
44. Id.
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the same as a proceeding against the owners of that property
because a personal liability may not be imposed on the prop-
erty owner."5 The property owner is liable only to the extent of
the value of the property brought before the court. "In
Pennoyer's terms, the owner is affected only 'indirectly' by an
in rem judgment adverse to his interest in the property subject
to the court's disposition."4
Modification of Pennoyer. A strict reading of Pennoyer
provided a rigid conceptual framework. 7 Recognizing that its
ruling could not accommodate some necessary litigation,"5 the
Pennoyer Court noted that cases, such as divorce actions, in-
volving the personal status of the plaintiff, could be adjudi-
cated in the plaintiff's home state even though the defendant
was not subject to service of process in the forum.49 The Court
also gave its approval to the concept whereby a foreign corpora-
tion doing business in a state could be said to have consented
to be sued in that state.'"
The Pennoyer rule was softened in subsequent cases where
the Supreme Court validated methods other than personal
service of process within the state for obtaining in personam
jurisdiction. In Adam v. Saenger,"5 the Court held that filing a
suit in a state may constitutionally subject the plaintiff to
jurisdiction of the court. Service could be made on the attorney
of record of the person filing the suit. In Milliken v. Meyer, 2
domicile was held to be a sufficient contact to permit a court
to exercise in personam jurisdiction. Blackmer v. United
States" held that citizenship is a constitutionally sufficient
contact with the state in order for its courts to render a personal
judgment.
In order to accommodate litigation that a strict applica-
tion of Pennoyer would not allow, the Court developed various
legal fictions. One fiction was to consider a corporation who
was doing business in a state as actually "present" in the
state. 4 Another was developed to accommodate auto accident
45. 433 U.S. at 197.
46. Id. at 199.
47. Id. at 201.
48. 95 U.S. at 734-35.
49. Id. at 735.
50. Id.
51. 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
52. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
53. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
54. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbon, 243 U.S. 264 (1917);
Int'l Harvestor Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
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litigation where the defendant was a non-resident of the forum
state.5 For example, in Hess v. Pawloski '6 a motorist, by using
a state's highways, was held to have appointed as his agent a
designated state official to accept service of process.
International Shoe. It was against this backgound that the
case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington57 was decided.
International Shoe evidenced a recognition that the Court, by
expanding Pennoyer and creating judicial fictions, was trying
to formulate a means for determining what activities of a de-
fendant in the forum state would make it just to subject that
defendant to suit in that state. International Shoe marked a
sweeping change in the rules governing in personam jurisdic-
tion. It cast aside the theory that a defendant must be physi-
cally present within the forum in order to justify an assertion
of in personam jurisdiction, and instead focused on the rela-
tionship between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum
state,5" establishing the rule that:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defen-
dant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." 51
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 6 ' assertion
of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant by a California
court was upheld, although his contacts with the state were
very "minimum." The defendant was an insurance company
which had no office or agent in California. The only contact the
company had with California was its sale of a life insurance
policy to a California resident. The company received insur-
ance premiums in Texas from the California resident. McGee
held that such contact was sufficient under International Shoe
for California to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defen-
dant insurance company."
After McGee, it seemed that a state could assert jurisdic-
tion over a defendant whose contact with the forum state was
very minimal. This notion was restricted somewhat in Hanson
55. See 433 U.S. at 202.
56. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
57. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
58. Id. at 319.
59. Id. at 316.
60. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
61. Id. at 223-34.
[Vol. 19
JURISDICTION AFTER SHAFFER
v. Denckla,2 where the Court emphasized that the flexible
standard of International Shoe did not eliminate all restric-
tions on the jurisdiction of state courts."3 Although minimum
contacts of International Shoe remained the test, the Hanson
Court added the requirement that "there must be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and protections of its laws.""
International Shoe was once again relied upon as authority
in Shaffer v. Heitner.5 There, however, International Shoe was
not only reaffirmed, it was reinterpreted and extended for the
first time to a case that was quasi in rem.
Shaffer DECISION: ISSUES AND CRITIQUE
Shaffer v. Heitner
Shaffer v. Heitner originated as a shareholder's derivative
suit in the state of Delaware. Suit was brought against defen-
dants Greyhound Corporation, its subsidiary Greyhound
Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and
directors of one or both of the corporations. Greyhound Corpo-
ration is incorporated under Delaware law with its principle
place of business in Phoenix, Arizona.
Since the individual defendants were not subject to the in
personam jurisdiction of the Delaware courts,6 the suit was
brought on a quasi in rem basis. The plaintiff attached and
brought before the court Delaware property of the non-resident
defendant, pursuant to a Delaware sequestration statute. 7 The
Delaware court asserted jurisdiction and rendered a quasi in
rem judgment against the defendants. This decision was af-
firmed by the Delaware Supreme Court." The individual de-
fendants [hereinafter referred to as appellants] petitioned the
62. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 253.
65. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
66. The individual defendants were non-residents of Delaware. According to Del-
aware law, non-resident defendants are not subject to the in personam jurisdiction of
Delaware courts. See note 67 infra.
67. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (Supp. 1970) provides in part:
(a) If it appears that in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that
the defendant . . . is a non-resident of the state, the Court may make
an order directing such non-resident defendant . . . to appear by a day
certain to be designated . . . . The Court may compel the appearance
of the defendant by seizure of all or any part of his property . ...
68. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
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United States Supreme Court, alleging that the Delaware se-
questration statute violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment both because it allowed state courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction in cases where there were no minimum con-
tacts between the defendants, the litigation, and the state of
Delaware, and because the statute operated to deprive the ap-
pellants of their property without providing sufficient proce-
dural safeguards. Certiorari was granted."
In assessing the validity of the appellants' jurisdictional
contentions, Mr. Justice Marshall, in his opinion for the Court,
first noted that there had been no sweeping changes in the rules
governing in rem jurisdiction analogous to those set forth in
International Shoe.7" He pointed out that many of the critics
of the Pennoyer rule had urged that the same standards govern-
ing in personam jurisdiction be used for in rem actions.7' Mar-
shall emphasized the Court's recognition, contrary to
Pennoyer, that an adverse judgment in rem directly affects a
property owner,7" and the Court's requirement that all efforts
must be made to give property owners actual notice of actions
against their property.73 Mr. Justice Marshall, recognizing that
jurisdiction over a thing is essentially the same as jurisdiction
over the interests of a person in a thing, concluded that the
same standards used to determine whether jurisdiction may be
asserted over a person must be used to determine whether juris-
diction may be asserted over property." The standards to be
used are those set forth in International Shoe.
The Shaffer Court recognized that there were strong argu-
ments against using the International Shoe rule in a situation
such as the one being considered.75 For example, the Court
noted that treating the mere presence of property as a sufficient
basis for asserting jurisdiction may prevent a defendant from
avoiding his obligations by keeping his assets in a place where
he is not subject to in personam jurisdiction.76 Marshall con-
cluded that there is nothing to justify that argument, pointing
out that all the plaintiff has to do is get an in personam judg-
69. Shaffer v. Heitner, 429 U.S. 813 (1976).
70. 433 U.S. at 205.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 206. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
73. Id. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 308 (1962); Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
74. 433 U.S. at 207.
75. Id. at 209.
76. Id. at 210.
[Vol. 19
JURISDICTION AFTER SHAFFER
ment in a state where jurisdiction could be asserted consistent
with International Shoe, and then institute a quasi in rem suit
on such judgment where the judgment debtor has property."
Another criticism of applying International Shoe to quasi
in rem actions noted in the Shaffer opinion was that by allow-
ing an assertion of such jurisdiction, the uncertainty of the
International Shoe test could be avoided, and the plaintiff
would be assured of a forum.7" Marshall, however, did not see
uncertainty as one of the factors inherent in International
Shoe79 and stated that the cost of assuring the plaintiff a forum
would be the "sacrifice of fair play and substantial justice"-a
price too high to pay.'"
Using the standards set forth in International Shoe, the
Shaffer court found that the presence of appellants' property
in Delaware could not, in and of itself, support Delaware's
assertion of jurisdiction over the appellants because "that
property is not the subject matter of the litigation, nor is the
underlying cause of action related to the property."'" Marshall
justified the overturning of extensive precedent, allowing juris-
diction based solely on the presence of property within a state,
by stating that the Court cannot and should not support an
"ancient form" that has no substantial modern justification.2
Appellee claimed that the individual defendants, as offi-
cers and directors of a corporation chartered in Delaware, did
have sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Delaware
such that jurisdiction could be asserted consistent with
International Shoe. They also claimed that Delaware had a
strong interest in supervising the management of a Delaware
corporation. The Shaffer Court answered appellee's arguments
by pointing out that the Delaware law basing jurisdiction on
the presence of property in the state, rather than on appellants'
status as corporate fiduciaries, failed to exhibit such a strong
state interest. 3 Marshall pointed out that while for choice of
law purposes, the contacts might make it proper to apply Dela-
ware law to the case, jurisdiction over the parties did not fol-
low. The Court concluded that by simply accepting positions
as officers or directors of a corporation incorporated in Dela-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 211.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 212.
83. Id. at 213.
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ware, appellants had not "purposefully availed themselves of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state in
a way that would justify bringing them before a Delaware tri-
bunal.""4
The Shaffer Court's ability to ascertain the existence or
nonexistence of minimum contacts between the appellants and
the state of Delaware is interesting in light of the fact that the
issue was never raised nor seriously considered by the Delaware
state courts. 5 Thus, the Court was never given a proper factual
foundation detailing the contacts between the appellants, the
litigation, and the state of Delaware.86
Moreover, this decision was partially based on the finding
that the Delaware legislature had made no provision for juris-
diction over corporate fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation
unless they owned stock or options in that corporation. "7 This
seems inconsistent with the Court's rejection of Pennoyer's ju-
risdictional framework, for the Shaffer Court, in rejecting
Pennoyer, also rejected the legal fictions, embodied in consent
statutes, that had been the inevitable consequence of the
Pennoyer rule. 8 Yet, in Shaffer the Court looked for such a
statute in the course of making its determination that there
were no minimum contacts. Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissent that the Court, in determining there were no minimum
contacts, was in fact trying to rest jurisdiction on a fictional
outgrowth of a system the Court rejected. "
The ambiguity in Shaffer ° can be resolved by looking at
its decision as an articulation of a fairness test. Instead of em-
phasizing minimum contacts as the primary aspect of the
84. Id. at 215.
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 213. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
88. Id. at 197-204.
89. Id. at 221-228. Justice Brennan felt that on the facts of this case minimum
contacts did exist between the appellants and Delaware. He asserted "that as a general
rule a state forum had jurisdiction to adjudicate a shareholder derivative action center-
ing on the conduct and policies of the directors and officers of a corporation chartered
by that state." Id. at 222. He said this is so because such an action is entertained on
behalf of the entire corporation, not just the individual plaintiff. Brennan also pointed
out that Delaware has a strong interest in asserting jurisdiction for three principal
reasons. First, Delaware should be allowed to provide restitution for local corporations
that have been victimized by fiduciary mismanagement. Second, Delaware has a man-
ifest regulatory interest. Finally, Delaware is a convenient forum for supervising and
overseeing a corporation that exists by the virtue of its laws. Id.
90. The Shaffer decision might be viewed as ambiguous for it seems that there
were in fact minimum contacts here, yet an assertion of jurisdiction was denied. See
note 89 and accompanying text supra.
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International Shoe rule, and the nexus between the defendant,
the litigation, and the forum state, Shaffer seems to be saying
that, assuming minimum contacts do exist between the defen-
dant, the litigation, and the state, a state may nevertheless be
foreclosed from asserting jurisdiction over a party-defendant if
it is unreasonable to do so.' Viewed in this light, Shaffer may
restrict the basis of jurisdiction as set out in International
Shoe. While the minimum contacts of International Shoe will
be required as a prerequisite to a state court's exercise of juris-
diction, Shaffer imposes an additional requirement of fair-
ness. 2 If fairness is, in fact, the standard Shaffer is enunciat-
ing, then the decision will certainly have a strong impact, not
only on quasi in rem jurisdiction to which it spoke, but also
on in personam jurisdiction. 3
Impact on Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
While Shaffer held that the mere presence of a non-
resident defendant's property within the forum state does not
of itself confer jurisdiction upon that state's courts, the pres-
ence of the defendant's property within the forum state may
indicate the existence of minimum contacts between the defen-
dant, the litigation, and the forum state sufficient to support
the state's assertion of jurisdiction under the rule of
International Shoe. 4 For example, if the litigation directly con-
cerns the property located within the forum state, or if the
claim arises out of the property, the minimum contacts re-
quirements would be fulfilled.9"
By holding that use of property in a state solely to estab-
lish a basis for the exercise of that state's jurisdiction does not
fulfull the contacts requirements of International Shoe, Shaffer
clearly overrules Harris v. Balk." In fact, Shaffer held the kind
of jurisdiction typified by Harris v. Balk unconstitutional: 7
In cases such as Harris and this one, the only role played
by the property is to provide a basis for bringing the defen-
dant into court. In such cases if a direct assertion of per-
91. 433 U.S. at 211; see notes 118-121 and accompanying text infra.
92. 433 U.S. at 211.
93. See notes 118-121 and accompanying text infra.
94. 433 U.S. at 207.
95. Id. at 207-08. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is also valid in cases where a resident
creditor brings suit to collect on a valid judgment rendered in another state, by attach-
ing property of the non-resident located in the forum state.
96. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
97. 433 U.S. at 209.
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sonal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the
Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion
would be equally impermissible."
Shaffer should also be read to overrule Seider v. Roth,99
already disapproved in California. 00 The methods used to ob-
tain jurisdiction in Seider and Harris are somewhat analogous.
By attaching the defendant's interests in property in the forum
state, the plaintiff in Seider was able to recover against a defen-
dant over whom the court had no personal jurisdiction. The
thrust of Shaffer will not uphold the type of direct action stat-
ute against an insurance company created by the Seider court
(at least if the insured is deemed the real party in interest) if
the insured has no connection with the forum state such that
it would be fair to confer jurisdiction under the minimum con-
tacts test of International Shoe.
One might wonder if there is anything left of quasi in rem
jurisdiction after Shaffer. In a state such as California, which
allows its courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction on any
basis as long as it does not contravene state or federal constitu-
tional requirements,' 0' quasi in rem jurisdiction may never be
needed, except in very limited actions.' 2 If the requirements of
International Shoe must be satisfied for all types of actions,
then in personam jurisdiction can be conferred on the court.
States with more restrictive long-arm statutes may still use
quasi in rem jurisdiction in cases where a California court could
exercise its in personam jurisdictional powers.' 3
Ex parte divorce proceedings, which are conceptually
quasi in rem proceedings, 04 will probably be unaffected by
Shaffer. Although in an ex parte divorce the absent defendant-
spouse usually has no contact and has caused no effect in the
forum state, the Shaffer rule will probably be read not to ex-
tend to ex parte divorce proceedings.'05 Shaffer will most likely
98. Id.
99. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
100. Javorek v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1976).
101. CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) provides that a California court
"may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
state or of the United States."
102. See notes 104-105 and accompanying text infra.
103. See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
104. In an ex parte divorce proceeding, the resident spouse brings the marriage
status, the res, before the court, and by virtue of attachment of that status the court
can dissolve the marriage, even though the absent spouse is not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the forum court.
105. It would be against public policy to make it difficult for persons to receive
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be limited to cases affecting property rights.""M Ex parte divorce
is not directly concerned with property rights."7 Its function is
merely to sever a status.
As a practical matter, certain in rem proceedings will be
unaffected by Shaffer. Disputes between parties over their
rights in specific property located within the state, such as
actions in ejectment, proceedings to quiet title, and proceed-
ings to remove a cloud on title, will in most instances fulfill the
in personam jurisdictional requirements of International Shoe
and Shaffer since a state has a manifest interest in adjudicat-
ing disputes over property within its territorial limits."' 8
Impact on In Personam Jurisdiction
Although Shaffer v. Heitner involved a quasi in rem case,
the constitutional standard it articulated may shed new light
on the rules governing in personam jurisdiction.""9 Most cases
concerning in personam jurisdiction, however, will probably
remain unchanged.
Hess v. Pawloski, "0 for example, upheld as constitutional
a statute that provided a motorist using Massachusetts' high-
ways consents to having the registrar of motor vehicles receive
service of process for him in suits arising out of his use of the
state's highways. Though Shaffer implied that resort to such
legal fictions should be rejected as an antiquated means of
obtaining jurisdiction,"' under a minimum contacts and fair-
ness analysis, Shaffer would certainly uphold Hess. The mini-
mum contacts requirement would be met as a motorist using a
state's highways can certainly be said to have "purposely
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.""' It would not be unfair to hold such a defendant
amenable to suit in the forum for a claim arising out of his use
of the state's highways. In fact, it would be unfair not to allow
the plaintiff to proceed against such a defendant.
In cases presenting facts not as clear-cut as the Hess situa-
divorce decrees. This would encourage adultery and cohabitation, things the state
would rather discourage. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 893 (1975) (dictum).
106. 433 U.S. at 205.
107. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
108. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 119-121 and accompanying text infra.
110. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
111. 97 S. Ct. at 2580.
112. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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tion, the impact of Shaffer is uncertain. A post-Shaffer juris-
dictional battle will focus on the facts. Its reasonableness test
will more often create a "could go either way" situation. The
facts in Kulko v. Superior Court"3 and Hartford v. Superior
Court"' illustrate this proposition.
In Kulko, the plaintiff, a California domiciliary, comm-
enced an action to establish a Haitian divorce as a judgment
of California, and to receive custody of her children and in-
creased child support from the defendant father, a non-resident
of California." 5 Years before the action was commenced, plain-
tiff and defendant had entered into a separation agreement
pursuant to which their two children were to live with their
father in New York during the school year and to spend vaca-
tions and the summer with the plaintiff in California. The
defendant agreed to support the children while they were with
the plaintiff in California. Three years before this action was
commenced, defendant's daughter, Ilsa, informed her father
that she wished to live with her mother in California, where-
upon he bought her a plane ticket to California. Thereafter,
plaintiff sent her son money so he could join her and Ilsa in
California."'
The California Supreme Court held that the defendant's
act of sending his daughter to California formed a basis to
exercise jurisdiction over him, not only to determine his obliga-
tion to support his daughter, but also to support his son since
the support of both was presented as a single issue in the under-
lying action."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the California Supreme Court, holding that its appli-
cation of the minimum contacts test of International Shoe
would sanction an unfair"' result. The Supreme Court im-
pliedly admitted that contacts did exist between the defen-
dant, the litigation, and the State of California,"' but never-
theless found, citing Shaffer, that California would be an unfair
forum in which to require the defendant to maintain a suit.'""
113. 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978).
114. 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956).
115. 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978).
116. Id.
117. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), reversed, 98 S. Ct.
1690 (1978).
118. 98 S. Ct. at 1697.
119. Id. at 1697-1701.
120. Id. at 1701.
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Kulko is illustrative of the type of case where the facts are
susceptible to two interpretations in determining if, where min-
imum contacts do exist, it would still be fair and reasonable to
require a party-defendant to defend in a particular forum. Jus-
tice Brennan, dissenting in Kulko, stated that, although he felt
that the majority's determination was not implausible:
[An) independent weighing of the facts leads me to con-
clude, in agreement with the analysis and determination
of the California Supreme Court, that appellant's connec-
tion with the State of California was not too attenuated,
under the standards of reasonableness and fairness im-
plicit in the due process clause, to require him to conduct
his defense in the California courts. 21
In Hartford v. Superior Court, 22 the plaintiff brought suit
in California to secure a declaration that the defendant, a non-
resident of California, was his father. The Hartford court held
that they could not assert jurisdiction over the defendant be-
cause he was not subject to personal service within the state.'23
The court could not treat the action as in rem because the relief
prayed for would amount to a personal judgment against the
defendant as it would bind him in subsequent litigation.' 4
If Hartford was decided now under the Shaffer criteria, the
California court would probably assert jurisdiction over the
defendant. The facts in Hartford demonstrated that the defen-
dant maintained businesses in California which brought him to
the state periodically.'2 This would provide systematic and
continuous activities and contacts subjecting the defendant to
local suit on any and all transitory causes of action. The fair-
ness requirements of Shaffer would be satisfied. It would not
have been a burden for the defendant in Hartford to defend a
suit in California. The type of suit that was brought was cer-
tainly foreseeable. The defendant could be deemed to have
been doing business in California, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws. Since Hartford would satisfy mini-
mum contacts and fairness requirements, Shaffer would up-
hold jurisdiction.
121. Id. at 1702.
122. 47 Cal. 2d 447, 453, 304 P.2d 1, 4 (1956).
123. Id. at 453, 304 P.2d at 4.
124. Id. at 450, 304 P.2d at 2.
125. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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CONCLUSION
The importance of Shaffer lies in its recognition that a
proceeding against property is essentially the same as a pro-
ceeding against owners of the property. Shaffer articulated a
fairness test that emphasizes the quality and nature of the
defendant's acts within the forum state as a prerequisite to a
state court's assertion of jurisdiction in all types of litigation
affecting the property rights of the defendant. The longstand-
ing rules of Pennoyer and its progeny have been toppled. The
quantitative and mechanical tests to determine whether a
court has jurisdiction, cast aside by International Shoe for in
personam cases, may no longer be relied on in any cases after
Shaffer v. Heitner.
Every case decided under Shaffer will have to be evaluated
according to its own peculiar facts. The results will depend on
the discretion of the judge hearing the case, as well as on the
competency of the litigants' counsel. The Shaffer test will lead
to uncertainty and litigation over jurisdictional issues will in-
crease. However, the outcome of such cases will be more just
than under pre-Shaffer jurisdictional rules, for Shaffer dictates
that fairness be the primary criteria in determining whether a
state court may assert jurisdiction.
Susan Norman
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